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The book by András Jakab makes an intriguing read for lawyers, political scientists and above 
all constitutional scholars. The author endeavors to acquaint the reader with the literature 
concerning the issues raised in the book in the theoretical premises of a specific scientific field 
and, referring to the title of the book, the European constitutional language. Although a 
recapitulative work is promised in the introduction, the author takes a strong line arguing 
alternatively for or against the theories to be found in the extensive constitutional law literature 
analyzed. He views the objective of constitutional theory as proposing a language for 
constitutional law discourse so as to be able to raise societal challenges to its level. 
These endeavors are difficult, especially in light of the fact that it is not difficult to express 
pessimistic views concerning an overall Europe-wide constitutional theory. 
To give an example, Raz draws attention to such difficulty in his study written on the authority 
and interpretation of constitutions. He takes a rather pessimistic tone in stating that 
unfortunately there are very few useful general theories directed at the interpretation of 
constitutions. The reason for this lies in elaborating such theories on the grounds of a given 
national constitution based on a specific legal system, the general applicability of which is 
virtually impossible.1 Jakab, however, purports to express his view on European constitutional 
theory and thereby provide a certain summary of relevant constitutional literature. Therefore, 
the author deliberately circumvents Raz’s trap mentioned above because he indicates a clear 
choice, namely that a European constitution does exist. In his book he categorically states that 
the basic documents of the EU satisfy the criteria for a constitution. 
What might strike the reader at first glance is that the author handles sources of legal theory 
well in comparison with more general and typical constitutional law papers, which alludes to a 
promising endeavor. On the other hand, he underscores his objective of not writing about 
constitutional legal theory. The author intends to raise theoretical issues of constitutional law 
onto a level higher than legal theory to analyze them in a more specific, contextualized and, if 
you will, more “lawyerly” form. Those interested in constitutional theory might be intrigued by 
the fact that the author represents a legal system that has sparked constitutional debate on the 
international scene in recent years. They might also be interested that the author himself has 
laid down a constitutional concept that diverges from governmental intentions. Therefore, we 
have a researcher who does not only possess practical knowledge in the interpretation of the 
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constitution, but also its framing process even though nothing really has ever materialized from 
his vision. 
If one takes a look at the book from a structural point of view, one can define three clear-cut 
sections. In Part I, a constitutional interpretation theory is outlined by Jakab who construes the 
constitution to be a specific case of legislative interpretation. With dynamic tricks, his aim is to 
help those applying the law make sense of abstract and unsophisticated texts in order for the 
sense thus unearthed to provide guidance for further application of the law. 
The author points out at the beginning of the book that the grammar of the constitutional 
language is made up of rules inherent to constitutional reasoning. Therefore, he aims to establish 
the foundations of constitutional theory by introducing and criticizing some methods of 
interpretation. The book may also serve as a course book, in which the palette for interpretation 
based on comparative constitutional literature is presented by the author only to opt for a 
preferred method of interpretation in the end. (Jakab considers these methods of interpretation 
to be norms regardless of the fact that they are only present in legal tradition or legislation 
adopted.) The author regards teleological interpretation as the most appropriate, which enables 
the text of the constitution to adapt to changing social circumstances. Objective teleological 
interpretation is viewed by the author as a meta-method susceptible to reduce arbitrariness by 
application and, by extension, legal insecurity, while ensuring the flexibility of the constitution. 
Perhaps the most interesting part for the reviewer encompasses a comparative analysis of 
European constitutional “dialects” or local instances of grammar, traditionally referred to as 
styles of reasoning. Following the presentation of paired-up German-Austrian, French-British 
and Hungarian-Spanish styles of reasoning, the author asks the question: Can one speak of a 
European style of constitutional reasoning? Do substantial differences exist between the styles 
of reasoning of European constitutional courts and those of courts vested with constitutional 
interpretation which may give rise to the emergence of an autonomous European style of 
reasoning? The author states that there are only shifts in emphasis while the elaboration of 
common constitutional law dogmatics and such a style of reasoning is urgently needed. 
Part II reveals an interpretation and analysis of key constitutional concepts (sovereignty, rule 
of law, constitution, democracy and nation). The author lays down the premise that the semantic 
content of these concepts is shaped by responses to current social challenges. The responses are 
produced either randomly in an ad hoc manner or on purpose. According to Jakab, this 
purposeful production in the past has the potential of redefining the concepts in the present and 
their semantic content could be adjusted to prevailing social challenges. 
The reader might be taken most aback by the proposed uses of the first concept. Concerning the 
concept of sovereignty, constitutional scholars’ task would not lie in intentionally making the 
meaning of sovereignty more complex and vague, thus rendering it neutral with a view to 
conceal and reconcile two irreconcilable views dividing Europe today. Harmony between 
national sovereignty and European integration as two directly opposing narratives can be 
fostered this way.2 The author somewhat contradicts himself at this point because he previously 
expounded his theory that constitutional scholars may be biased to the extent of having a 
political vision (p. 20). It stretches the imagination that a political vision would lack 
commitment to such a basic issue. 
The author considers that rethinking or reinterpreting the rule of law concept, however, is not 
necessary even in circumstances overshadowed by the threat of terrorism, which is not an 
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original thought, but the sturdiness of the standpoint is all the more likable. One should not 
discount or weaken the concept of the rule of law in the fight against terrorism when opening 
the floodgates of total governmental discretion. 
Obviously, the most gripping question in the part discussing the true nature of the constitution 
is whether or not one can actually talk about a European constitution. Does the EU have a 
codified constitution in spite of failed efforts to adopt one? The author, using the criteria of his 
own notion for ‘constitution’,3 responds in the affirmative. However, he sees the constitution 
not having a symbolic content as a discrepancy. Constitutional scholars may help provide a 
remedy for this discrepancy if they refer to the basic documents as a constitution and use the 
vocabulary elaborated for constitutions for the concepts contained in them. The idea of inviting 
constitutional legal academia to consistently wield such a vocabulary may seem to have been 
written in a voluntarist spirit. Nevertheless, the following question is of more poignant nature: 
Would this attitude be susceptible of redressing current European problems? 
Analyzing the subject of democracy, the possibility of a European demos and popular 
sovereignty and the arguments developed in relation to this subject must be underscored in the 
first instance. Jakab sees the elimination of the democratic deficit and the development of a real 
European sense of community in the creation of a direct relationship between elections and the 
political responsibility of the EU government (that is, the Commission) as well as the formation 
of a real European party system. 
The author examines the concept of nation to the greatest extent as the last one in the category 
of key concepts deemed by constitutional scholars to be of utmost importance. The extent of 
this analysis is no coincidence since the usage of the concept of nation has a particular topicality 
in current constitutional law discourse. Based on the discussion of different nation concepts, 
the author outlines opportunities for strengthening a European identity. To this end, he does not 
fail to draw attention to the constitutional scholars’ task to rely on the European population as 
the European nation. However, Jakab himself has doubts about the possibility of creating EU 
national awareness. 
In Part III which concludes the book, with an intention being slightly outrageous, the author 
analyzes the “analytical framework” and concepts of a constitutional law discourse, which in a 
certain sense, according to Jakab, are wholly redundant. The author points out that these notions 
and theories are usually there in current professional discourse out of habit; however, they 
present no real increments for constitutional law. Thus, Jakab regards state doctrine 
(Staatslehre) in this way which, following a lengthy analysis does not yield any practicable 
conceptual framework. Consequently, he does not recommend establishing a European 
constitutional discourse thereon. He approaches the theory of Stufenbaulehre or ‘step structure 
doctrine’ similarly, discarding it in its entirety, but views certain elements thereof as worthy of 
retention (such as method purity). As he puts it in a slightly provocative manner: “These 
elements are, however, only ‘organs to be transplanted’ from the dead body of the Pure Theory 
of Law, whose heart – the Stufenbaulehre – is no longer capable of keeping the body alive.” 
Jakab thinks the concept of legal principles to be also superfluous, and he does not accept their 
difference from other norms. He only considers principles (or at least what is normally referred 
to as such) to be very important (or fundamental) rules. Finally, he is rather heavy-handed with 
the public law—private law divide as well. Regarding this, the author voices his view that the 
division is artificial; however, its use is justifiable. As Seidman wrote it in 1987: “few would 
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argue that the boundary between public and private is in any way natural”.4 Jakab does not 
belong to this group, but he regards the use of the division as sustainable along the lines of the 
following definition: “(1) public law comprises the affairs/rules that are traditionally regarded 
as belonging to public law; (2) in (new) cases of doubt, that is, where the former traditional 
interpretation does not help, the decisive factor should be that no individual should lack the 
access to the protection of rights (redress).” (p. 395) 
András Jakab’s book has taken more than ten years to be written in English (and later Hungarian 
as well). This work is a reflection on new scientific developments and the author’s own 
standpoint, with changes the latter apparent from the pages herein reviewed. The sometimes 
polarized and jaundiced views thus taken should be appreciated against this background as the 
author has also been in debate with himself preparing this work. The long period during which 
the book was written can easily be noticed if editing mistakes or orthographical errors are 
sought by the attentive reader – to no avail. This fact does not only praises the author, but also 
the copy editors and obviously the publisher.  
Despite the existence of a common European constitutional heritage pronounced many times 
by the judicial bodies of the European Union, those who do not believe and do not want to 
believe in the possibility of creating a common European constitutional law and constitutional 
language will also be interested to read the book. Apart from the ambitious intention, the author 
has written a comparative constitutional work which, beyond professional discourse, can be 
aptly used for education as well and informs public opinion about current trends and issues in 
European constitutional development. 
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